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ABSTRACT: We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of auc-
tions. New buyers and objects may arrive at random times. Buyers’ private values, how-
ever, are not persistent. Instead, buyers draw new values in every period; equivalently,
objects are heterogeneous but are drawn from the same distribution.
We consider the use of the second-price auction for selling these objects. In equilibrium,
buyers do not bid their true value. Instead, they shade their bids down by their continua-
tion value, which is the option value of participating in future auctions. We show that this
option value depends not only on the number of buyers currently present on the market,
but also on anticipated market dynamics. We also generalize our results to the setting in
which values correspond to a “buyer’s market” or a “seller’s market” and market condi-
tions evolve, with persistence, from one to the other.
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SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS WITH RANDOMLY ARRIVING BUYERS
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider a model of dynamic markets in which buyers and sellers arrive ran-
domly to the market. We examine the equilibrium behavior of market participants in response to
these arrivals, as well as to changes in market conditions. In particular, we investigate the role of
current and anticipated future conditions in determining endogenous outside options in this set-
ting. We characterize the influence of these outside options on equilibrium price determination,
and study the manner in which equilibrium payoffs and behavior are affected by both current
conditions and future dynamics.
Consider the case of an individual who wants to purchase a new home. After surveying the
houses available on the market, a potential buyer will determine which house best matches her
individual preferences as well as her budgetary constraints, and will make an offer on that home.
Obviously, the amount of her offer will depend on the physical characteristics of the home: the
size of the house, the neighborhood or school district in which it lies, the potential for resale in the
future, and so on. Note that this heterogeneity is evaluated differently by different buyers. In ad-
dition, however, market conditions will play a large role. In a “seller’s market” in which demand
for housing is large relative to supply, prices will be higher. Abstracting away from immediate
housing needs, expectations about future market conditions and the dynamics governing them
will also play an important role. If high demand is expected to be only a short-lived phenomenon,
prices will be attenuated somewhat, especially if buyers are patient. Similarly, if a large number of
homes are expected to come onto the market in the near future, prices will be further depressed.
Thus, the offer of a potential homebuyer will depend on both the current competitiveness of the
market as well as the anticipated characteristics of the market in the near future.
As an alternative example, consider online auction markets. eBay, for instance, has developed
into a multi-billion dollar marketplace for the sale and resale of both new and used goods. Buyers
on eBay for any particular good have available to them a wide array of different sellers from
which they may purchase the object, with different participants in each auction and, often, slightly
differing characteristics of the object in question. For instance, there is frequently some exogenous
variation in the condition of a used object, and different sellers can, and do, ship their items from
various locations. Therefore, as individuals place their bids, they must take into account the fact
that they are not participating in a one-shot auction—they are free to costlessly participate in a
later auction if they are outbid and lose.
The present work abstracts away from many of the details of these various markets, focusing on
what we view as the essential features. In particular, we examine the situation in which buyers are
confronted with an infinite sequence of auctions for stochastically equivalent objects that arrive at
random times. Moreover, new buyers probabilistically arrive on the market in each period. Thus,
in any given auction, buyers are presented with the outside option of participating in a future
auction for an “equivalent” object, but with a potentially different number of competitors. We
provide a precise characterization of this option value, and explore the manner in which it varies
with the number of buyers currently present on the market, as well as the expectations of future
market conditions.
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Essentially, losing in an auction today yields the opportunity to participate in another auction
in the future; however, the potential for entry by additional buyers and the random arrival times
of auctions implies, in contrast to much of the literature on sequential auctions, that the compet-
itive environment in the future may differ significantly from the present one. Thus, the expected
payoff of a buyer currently present on the market is directly linked to her expected payoffs with
a different number of competitors present in future periods. This leads to a difference equation
characterizing the “outside option” available to each buyer, which is endogenously determined
in equilibrium. We show that this outside option is, in fact, an appropriately discounted sum
of expected payoffs from participating in each of the infinite sequence of auctions with differing
numbers of participants, where the weight on each auction is a combination of pure time discount-
ing and the likelihood of market dynamics leading to the corresponding state. Moreover, optimal
bidding behavior accounts for the option value in a straightforward and separable manner. Fi-
nally, this result is robust to various assumptions regarding the evolution of valuations, as well as
to changes in the trading institution employed.
The present work is related to, and complements, several strands of the literature on dynamic
markets and bargaining. In an insightful early work, Taylor (1995) examines bargaining power
and price formation as it relates to the number of traders on each side of a market. His model
assumes that agents are homogeneous—all buyers have the same commonly known value for
purchasing an object—and that trade is conducted via posted prices. Our model enriches his set-
ting by allowing for heterogeneous buyers and objects, employing an auction mechanism for price
determination. The theme and questions of this paper are also connected to those of Satterthwaite
and Shneyerov (2007). These authors consider a world in which a continuum of both buyers and
sellers enter in every period, following time-invariant strategies in a steady-state equilibrium. The
present work, on the other hand, is concerned with the behavior of agents in a dynamic environ-
ment with constantly changing conditions, and so a steady-state analysis runs counter to its goals.
Inderst (2008) considers a bargaining model in which a seller is randomly visited by hetero-
geneous buyers. If the seller is currently engaged in bargaining with one agent when another
arrives, she may choose to switch from bargaining with one buyer to bargaining with the other.
However, this switch is permanent, implying that the arrival of a new buyer either “restarts” the
game or is completely irrelevant. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2008) take a different approach: they
consider an incomplete information bargaining problem between a buyer and a seller, and al-
low for the possibility of the arrival of various “events.” These events end the game and yield
an exogenously determined expected payoff to each agent. The suggested interpretation is that
these events may be viewed as triggers for some sort of multi-lateral mechanism involving new
entrants (a second-price auction, for example) for which the expected payoffs are a reduced-form
representation. Thus, while both works are primarily concerned with characterizing the endoge-
nous option value that results from the potential arrival of additional participants to the market,
they do this in a framework of bilateral bargaining which fails to capture the dynamic nature of
direct competition between several current and future potential market participants.
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The present work is also closely linked to certain elements of the sequential auctions literature.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) studies sequential auctions in which a fixed number of perfectly pa-
tient buyers with single-unit demand compete in a finite sequence of second-price auctions for
stochastically equivalent objects. His model, however, does not allow for several features of the
present work; in particular, it does not allow for the entry of new buyers or consider the role of
market dynamics in price determination. Said (2009) looks at a model with entry dynamics simi-
lar to the present work, but makes the complementary (and opposite) assumption of independent
private values that are fixed across time and focuses on the design of optimal (direct and indirect)
mechanisms. As in the present work, outside options are endogenously determined; however, the
presence of persistent private values introduces an element of learning that is not present herein.
Sailer (2006) and Zeithammer (2006) both conduct empirical examinations of eBay auctions
while taking into consideration the sequential nature of that market. Although the latter is dif-
ferentiated by the introduction of an assumption that buyers are able to observe their valuation
for some upcoming objects, both authors assume a fixed number of competing buyers in each
period, and therefore are unable to account for fluctuations in market conditions and competitive-
ness. Essentially, they assume away the existence of variation in market conditions. Thus, they
are closely related to the special case of our model in which an auction occurs in every period and
the winning bidder is always replaced by exactly one new buyer, ensuring that market conditions
remain stationary.1
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model, and Section 3 solves for the
equilibrium. Section 4 discusses some comparative statics results. Section 5 demonstrates the
robustness of the model in a setting where market characteristics may vary from one period to the
next. Finally, Section 6 concludes and suggests some avenues for further research. All proofs are
found in the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
We consider the continuous-time limit of a discrete-time market model; periods of length ∆ are
indexed by t ∈ N. There is a finite number nt of risk-neutral buyers with single-unit demand
on the market in any given period t. Each buyer i ∈ {1, . . . , nt} has a valuation vti , where vti
has distribution F on R+, where we assume that F has finite variance and a continuous density
function f . Valuations are private information, and are independently and identically distributed,
both across buyers and across objects over time. Thus, each buyer’s valuation for a given object is
a different independent draw from the distribution F; the objects are, as in Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(1994), stochastically equivalent. Finally, we assume that buyers discount the future exponentially
with discount factor δ = e−r∆, where the discount rate is r > 0.
In each period, there is at most one seller present. The arrival of sellers is stochastic; in partic-
ular, there is some exogenously fixed probability p = λ∆,λ > 0 that a new seller arrives on the
market in each period. Similarly, additional buyers may arrive on the market in each period. For
simplicity, we will assume that at most one buyer arrives at a time, and that this arrival occurs
1Nekipelov (2007) also models eBay auctions, taking into account the random nature of entry in that market. However,
his model is concerned with the role of new entrants within a single auction, and hence is best viewed as complementary
to the present work.
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with some exogenously given probability q = ρ∆, ρ > 0. In the event that a seller has arrived on
the market, each buyer i observes both vti and the number of competing buyers present. The seller
then conducts a second-price auction to allocate their object.
Note that we assume that sellers are not strategic—they are unable to set a reserve price and
are not permitted to remain on the market for more than one period.2 Conversely, buyers must
participate in each auction that takes place when they are present on the market, but may submit
negative bids. The only exception is the case in which a buyer would be the sole participant in an
auction; in such situations, the buyer is given the option of receiving the object at a price of zero or
waiting for a new draw from the distribution F in the subsequent period. This may be viewed as
the reduced-form version of a bargaining game between the buyer and the seller: since the seller
is impatient, she is willing to accept any offer made by the buyer. The buyer, however, may wish
to exercise her own outside option and wait for a new draw from the distribution F.
We will write Y(n)k to denote the k-th highest of n independent draws from F, and G
(n)
k and
g(n)k will denote the corresponding distribution and density functions, respectively, of this random
variable. In addition, we will define, for all n ∈N,
Ŷ(n) := E
[
Y(n)1
]
−E
[
Y(n−1)1
]
.
This is the expected difference between the highest of n and n − 1 independent draws from the
distribution F, where, by convention, we let E
[
Y(0)1
]
= 0.
3. EQUILIBRIUM
Let V(vti , n) denote the expected payoff to a bidder when her valuation is v
t
i and she is one
of n bidders present on the market. Recall that a seller must be currently present on the market
for buyers to be aware of their valuations. Furthermore, let W(n) denote the expected value to
a buyer when she is one of n buyers present on the market at the beginning of a period, before
the realization of the buyer and seller arrival processes. At the beginning of a period when there
are n buyers present, there are four possible outcomes: with probability pq, both a buyer and a
seller may arrive, leading to an auction with n + 1 participants; with probability p(1 − q) only
a seller arrives, yielding an auction with n participants; with probability (1− p)q only a buyer
may arrive, leading to the next period starting with n + 1 participants; or, with the remaining
probability (1− p)(1− q), neither a buyer nor a seller may arrive, leading to the next period being
identical to the current one. Thus,
W(n) := pqE[V(vti , n + 1)] + p(1− q)E[V(vti , n)]
+ (1− p)qδW(n + 1) + (1− p)(1− q)δW(n). (1)
Let us now consider the problem facing buyer i when there are n > 1 buyers on the market
and an object is currently available (and, hence, an auction is “about” to occur). This buyer, with
valuation vti must choose her bid b
t
i . If she wins the auction, she receives a payoff of v
t
i less the
2This assumption of no reserve prices is ultimately motivated by technical factors—if reserve prices (even one at zero)
were permitted, then the equations characterizing equilibrium in this model form a second-order non-homogeneous
and nonlinear difference equation. Solving such a difference equation numerically, let alone analytically, appears to be
an exercise in futility.
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second-highest bid. On the other hand, if she loses, she remains on the market as one of n − 1
buyers tomorrow, yielding her a payoff of δW(n− 1). Therefore,
V(vti , n) = max
bti
 Pr
(
bti > maxj 6=i{btj}
)
E
[
vti −maxj 6=i{btj}|bti > maxj 6=i{btj}
]
+Pr
(
bti < maxj 6=i{btj}
)
δW(n− 1)
 .
We may use this expression in order to determine equilibrium bid functions, as demonstrated in
the following result.
LEMMA 1 (Equilibrium bids).
In equilibrium, a buyer with value vti who is one of n > 1 buyers on the market bids b
t
i = b
∗(vti , n), where
b∗(vti , n) := v
t
i − δW(n− 1). (2)
Given this bidding strategy and the fact that continuation payoffs do not differ across buyers,
the probability of i winning the auction in period t is simply Pr(vti > maxj 6=i{vtj}), and the surplus
gained in this case becomes vti −maxj 6=i{vtj}. Therefore, we may rewrite V as
V(vti , n) = Pr(v
t
i > maxj 6=i
{vtj})E
[
vti −maxj 6=i {v
t
j}|vti > maxj 6=i {v
t
j}
]
+ δW(n− 1)
= Pr
(
Y(n−1)1 < v
t
i
)
E
[
vti −Y(n−1)1 |Y(n−1)1 < vti
]
+ δW(n− 1)
= G(n−1)1 (v
t
i)
(
vti −E
[
Y(n)2 |Y(n)1 = vti
])
+ δW(n− 1), (3)
where the equivalence between the second and third lines relies on the properties of the highest
and second-highest order statistics.3
Note that, ex ante, any one of the n > 1 buyers present on the market in any period is equally
likely to have the highest value amongst her competitors (and hence win the object). We may use
this fact, along with the result above, to show that the ex ante expected utility of a buyer when
there is an object available for sale is simply the sum of her probability of winning the object
multiplied by her expected payoff, conditional on winning, and the discounted option value of
losing the object and remaining on the market in the next period. Formally, we are able to prove
the following result.
LEMMA 2 (Expected auction payoffs).
The expected payoff to a bidder from an auction with n > 1 participants is
E[V(vti , n)] = Ŷ(n) + δW(n− 1). (4)
With this result in hand, we may rewrite Equation (1) for n > 1 in terms of W and Ŷ alone:
W(n + 1) =
1− δpq− δ(1− p)(1− q)
δ(1− p)q W(n)−
p(1− q)
(1− p)qW(n− 1)
− p
δ(1− p) Ŷ(n + 1)−
p(1− q)
δ(1− p)qŶ(n).
(5)
3See, for example, David and Nagaraja (2003, Chapter 3).
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In the case in which n = 1, however, the expression differs due to a lone buyer’s ability to “pass”
on purchasing an object. In particular, we have
V(vti , 1) = max
{
vti , δW(1)
}
.
Therefore,
W(1) = pq
(
Ŷ(2) + δW(1)
)
+ p(1− q) (F (δW(1)) δW(1) + (1− F (δW(1))E [v|v > δW(1)])
+ (1− p)qδW(2) + (1− p)(1− q)δW(1). (6)
Thus, the expected payoff to a buyer is given by a solution to the second-order non-homogenous
linear difference equation in Equation (5) and boundary condition in Equation (6). While it is pos-
sible to find a solution to this system, the continuous-time limit is much more tractable. Recalling
that δ = e−r∆, p = λ∆, and q = ρ∆ and taking the limit as ∆ goes to zero yields
W(n + 1) =
r + λ+ ρ
ρ
W(n)− λ
ρ
(
Ŷ(n) +W(n− 1)
)
for all n > 1, and (7)
W(1) =
λ (1− F(W(1)))
r + λ(1− F(W(1))) + ρE [v|v > W(1)] +
ρ
r + λ(1− F(W(1))) + ρW(2). (8)
We may then rewrite this second-order difference equation as a first-order system of difference
equations. In particular, we have, for all k > 0,(
W(k + 2)
W(k + 1)
)
=
[
r+λ+ρ
ρ −λρ
1 0
](
W(k + 1)
W(k)
)
+
(
−λρ Ŷ(k + 1)
0
)
. (9)
Note that there exist an infinite number of solutions (in general) to this difference equation;
indeed, even accounting for the boundary condition in Equation (8), there is a continuum of solu-
tions which satisfy the difference equation. However, we are able to rule out solutions in which
expected utility diverges to infinity (positive or negative) as the number of buyers on the market
grows—it is possible to show that there exists a unique bounded (and hence “sensible”) solution
to the difference equation. To characterize this solution, define
ζ1 :=
r + λ+ ρ−√(r + λ+ ρ)2 − 4λρ
2ρ
and ζ2 :=
r + λ+ ρ+
√
(r + λ+ ρ)2 − 4λρ
2ρ
.
These two constants are the eigenvalues of the “transition” matrix in Equation (9). It is straight-
forward to show that ζ1ζ2 = λρ and 0 < ζ1 < 1 < ζ2 for all r,λ, ρ > 0.
PROPOSITION 1 (Equilibrium payoffs with buyer arrivals).
The unique symmetric equilibrium of this infinite-horizon sequential auction game is defined by the ex ante
expected payoff function given by
W(n) = ζn−11 W(1) +
ζn1ζ2
ζ2 − ζ1
n−1
∑
k=1
(
ζ−k1 − ζ−k2
)
Ŷ(k + 1) +
ζ1ζ
n
2 − ζn1ζ2
ζ2 − ζ1
∞
∑
k=n
ζ−k2 Ŷ(k + 1), (10)
where W(1) solves
r + λ(1− F(W(1))) + ρ
ρ
W(1)− λ
ρ
(1− F(W(1)))E[v|v ≥W(1)] = ζ1W(1) + ζ1ζ2
∞
∑
k=1
ζ−k2 Ŷ(k + 1).
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(B) Exponentially distributed values
FIGURE 1. W(n) with r = 0.1, λ = 2, and ρ = 1.
We may now calculate the expected payoffs of buyers for each value of n ∈ N. Figure 1 dis-
plays an example of these paths for two distributions of values: the uniform and the exponential.
A consistent feature of the plot of W is the “hump” shape, in which buyer values are initially in-
creasing in n and then decreasing asymptotically towards zero. The reason for this is the manner
in which buyers shade their bids downwards; in particular, when a buyer is alone on the market
and chooses to purchase an object, she receives the object for free, while if she were to be one of
several buyers present, the amount she would have to pay when winning an object may be nega-
tive. Thus, for low levels of n, a buyer’s expected payoff may be increasing in n. However, as the
number of buyers present on the market increases, the likelihood of winning an object decreases,
as does the likelihood of the second-highest value being low enough for the price to be negative. It
is important to note that this observation is not an artifact of the second-price auction, as revenue
equivalence implies that any standard auction format will lead to identical expected payments.
Rather, this is due to the assumption that sellers may not set reserve prices and are willing to
accept negative prices.4
Note that this solution is easily generalized to trading institutions other than the sequential
second-price auction. By revenue equivalence, Ŷ(n) is the ex ante expected payoff of a buyer in
any standard one-shot auction mechanism with n buyers. Therefore, Equation (10) continues to
hold, as is, for markets in which objects are sold via, for instance, sequential first-price auctions—
while buyers’ bids will differ, their expected payoffs will remain the same, and hence Equation (10)
continues to characterize equilibrium payoffs.
On the other hand, if a different trading institution were to be employed, then replacing Ŷ(n)
by the appropriate ex ante expected payoff of a buyer in that mechanism would yield the corre-
sponding solution for that institution. For example, suppose that each seller employs a (fixed)
multi-lateral bargaining game for allocating her object. Letting Y˜(n) denote the ex ante expected
payoff to each of n buyers from participating in this one-shot bargaining game, equilibrium in
4Recall that this assumption is motivated by technical factors—in the presence of reserve prices, then the characteriza-
tion in Equation (5) of W(n) would become a second-order non-homogeneous and nonlinear difference equation. Such
systems are notoriously intractable, even in the face of numerical approaches.
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FIGURE 2. W(n) with exponentially distributed values, r = 0.05, λ = 2, and ρ ∈ { 12 , 1, 32}.
the resulting dynamic market is then characterized by the analogue to Equation (10) where Ŷ is
replaced by Y˜.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
In order to better understand the effects of time and entry on the payoffs of agents in this mar-
ket, we consider some comparative statics. Unfortunately, changes in the parameters often have
countervailing effects, and clean comparative statics results are difficult, if not impossible to de-
rive. In particular, the effect of changes in the parameters depends upon the relationship between
them as embodied in ζ1 and ζ2, and such effects may go in either direction.
Moreover, the changes in the parameters have, in addition to scale effects on W(n), shape effects:
the size, or even existence, of the “hump” described above is affected by changes in these param-
eters. This is most clearly seen by considering Figure 2, which plots W for various values of ρ. It
is immediately apparent that the relationship between ρ and W is non-monotonic and dependent
upon n and the other parameters.
More positive results are possible for understanding the effects of changes in the distribution of
values on payoffs. Notice that buyer welfare is an increasing function of Ŷ(k) for all k ∈ N, and
recall that
Ŷ(k) = E
[
Y(k)1
]
−E
[
Y(k−1)1
]
=
1
k
(
E
[
Y(k)1
]
−E
[
Y(k)2
])
.
Thus, a distributional change that systematically affects this difference will effectively lead to a
change in buyer welfare. Notice, however, that replacing F by a distribution G such that stochasti-
cally dominates F is not sufficient for increasing Ŷ. Although such a change increases bothE
[
Y(k)1
]
and E
[
Y(k)2
]
, it may decrease the difference between the two.5 Thus, standard stochastic domi-
nance is not sufficient for our purposes, as the ordering of the distributions is reversed when
considering the difference between order statistics.6
5This difference is referred to by the statistics literature as a “sample spacing.” The curious reader is referred to Boland
and Shanthikumar (1998) for an overview of stochastic ordering of order statistics, and to Xu and Li (2006) for additional
results on the stochastic ordering of sample spacings.
6We should point out that the bounded support of these two distributions is not essential to this argument.
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The statistics literature, however, has identified two different conditions that are sufficient for
our purposes. First, Kochar (1999) shows that if G dominates F in terms of the hazard rate order
and either F or G display a decreasing hazard rate, then Ŷ(k|G) ≥ Ŷ(k|F) for all k ∈ N. Recall
that the hazard rate of a distribution H with density h is given by
λH(t) =
h(t)
1− H(t) .
Therefore, G dominates F in terms of the hazard rate if
λG(t) ≤ λF(t) for all t.
Note that hazard rate dominance implies first-order stochastic dominance. Second, Bartoszewicz
(1986) demonstrates that, if G dominates F in terms of the dispersive order, then we again have
Ŷ(k|G) ≥ Ŷ(k|F) for all k ∈ N. A distribution G dominates the distribution F in terms of the
dispersive order if, for all 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1,
G−1(y)− G−1(x) ≥ F−1(y)− F−1(x).
This is a variability ordering, in the sense that it requires the difference of quantiles of F to be
smaller than the difference of the corresponding quantiles of G. Intuitively, when the quantiles of
a distribution are more spread out, there is greater variance in the upper tail, and hence a larger
difference between the first- and second-order statistics.
5. MARKOVIAN VALUES
Throughout, we have assumed that objects are stochastically equivalent; in effect, this implies
that history is irrelevant except for its role in determining the current number of market partici-
pants. While this is a convenient assumption for the sake of tractability—implying, for instance,
that we need not worry about issues of learning and the standard results of the second-price
sealed-bid auction apply—it is somewhat limiting in its scope.
We therefore generalize the model and consider a world in which history does matter, although
in a manner that still allows for a similar form of analysis. In particular, we consider a model
in which buyers’ values are drawn from one of two different distributions, and the distributions
are “persistent” in the sense that the distribution is chosen according to a (known) Markov pro-
cess. In particular, if the values are drawn from one distribution today, then they are likely to be
drawn from the same distribution again tomorrow. The impetus behind such a modeling choice
is the idea of a “buyer’s” or “seller’s” market; one distribution corresponds to the case in which,
for some unmodeled exogenous reason, demand (and hence willingness to pay) is higher, inde-
pendent of the number of current competitors, whereas the second corresponds to the case in
which demand is relatively low. As the external forces driving value distributions typically do not
change overnight, a buyer’s market is likely to persist for some time.
Thus, we consider the case in which there are two states of the world {ω1,ω2} ∈ Ω. In state ωi,
values are drawn from the distribution Fi (with corresponding density fi). The state of the world
is assumed to be commonly knowledge in each period. In addition, the (symmetric) probability
of transitioning from one state to the other is τ = pi∆,pi > 0. Note that the model is easily
9
MAHER SAID
generalized to a greater number of states or asymmetric transitions; doing so would, however,
greatly complicate notation and explication while providing little in the way of additional insight.
We will denote by W(n,ωi) the expected payoff to a buyer when the state of the world is ωi ∈ Ω
and there are n total buyers present in the market; recall that this is an ex ante payoff, as this is
before a seller has arrived on the market in the period and the buyers do not yet know their valu-
ations. We will denote by V(vti , n,ω) the expected payoff to a buyer when a seller has arrived, and
hence the buyer knows her value vti , and, slightly abusing notation, we will write E[V(v
t
i , n,ωi)]
to denote the expected value to a buyer when a seller is present but the buyer does not (yet) know
her value; the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution Fi.
Thus, for i ∈ {1, 2}, we have
W(n,ωi) = pqE[V(vti , n + 1,ωi)] + p(1− q)E[V(vti , n,ωi)]
+ δ(1− p)
[
(1− τ)qW(n + 1,ωi) + τqW(n + 1,ω−i)
+ (1− τ)(1− q)W(n,ωi) + τ(1− q)W(n,ω−i)
]
.
Furthermore, it is relatively straightforward (using the same methods as in previous sections) to
see that Lemma 1 again applies in this setting—a buyer’s optimal behavior is to bid her true value
less her continuation value. This implies that
E[V(vti , k,ωi)] = Ŷ(k,ωi) + δ [(1− τ)W(k− 1,ωi) + τW(k− 1,ω−i)] .
Combining these two expressions leads to a system of (coupled) second-order difference equa-
tions. Once again, the arithmetic becomes cumbersome due to the interaction of the various pa-
rameters; therefore, we pass to the continuous time limit as ∆ approaches zero. This yields
W(n + 2,ωi) =
r + pi + λ+ ρ
ρ
W(n + 1,ωi)− pi
ρ
W(n + 1,ω−i)
− λ
ρ
Ŷ(n + 1,ωi)− λ
ρ
W(n,ωi) for all n > 1.
(11)
Notice that this expression is, in fact, a difference equation that is second-order in W(·,ωi). How-
ever, W(·,ω−i) also appears in the equation, implying that we have a coupled system of difference
equations.
As in the previous section, we are interested in finding a solution to this system of difference
equations. Moreover, we require that this solution be bounded, as well as that the solution satisfies
the appropriate boundary conditions. These boundary conditions may be found in a manner
analogous to those discussed previously. Specifically, a buyer who is alone on the market may
choose to wait, taking into account the possibility of the state switching before another seller
arrives on the market. This leads to
(r + λ(1− Fi(W(1,ωi))) + ρ+ pi)W(1,ωi)
= λ (1− Fi(W(1,ωi)))E[v|v > W(1,ωi)] + ρW(2,ωi) + piW(1,ω−i). (12)
Once again, this system of difference equations has a continuum of solutions when we ignore
the boundedness constraint; however, we can show, in a manner similar to that of the previ-
ous sections, that there exists a unique bounded solution that satisfies the boundary conditions of
10
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Equation (12). To characterize this solution, define
ξ1 =
r + λ+ ρ+ 2pi −√(r + λ+ ρ+ 2pi)2 − 4λρ
2ρ
and
ξ2 =
r + λ+ ρ+ 2pi +
√
(r + λ+ ρ+ 2pi)2 − 4λρ
2ρ
,
as well as
ξ3 =
r + λ+ ρ−√(r + λ+ ρ)2 − 4λρ
2ρ
and
ξ4 =
r + λ+ ρ+
√
(r + λ+ ρ)2 − 4λρ
2ρ
.
Note that 0 < ξ1, ξ3 < 1 < ξ2, ξ4 and ξ1ξ2 = λρ = ξ3ξ4. We then have
PROPOSITION 2 (Equilibrium payoffs with Markovian values).
The unique symmetric equilibrium with bounded payoffs of this infinite-horizon sequential auction game is
determined by the ex ante expected payoff functions given by, for i = 1, 2,
W(n,ωi) = ξn−11
(
W(1,ωi)−W(1,ω−i)
2
)
+
ξn1ξ2
ξ2 − ξ1
(
n−1
∑
k=1
(
ξ−k1 − ξ−k2
) Ŷ(k + 1,ωi)− Ŷ(k + 1,ω−i)
2
)
+
ξ1ξ
n
2 − ξn1ξ2
ξ2 − ξ1
(
∞
∑
k=n
ξ−k2
Ŷ(k + 1,ωi)− Ŷ(k + 1,ω−i)
2
)
+ ξn−13
(
W(1,ωi) +W(1,ω−i)
2
)
+
ξn3ξ4
ξ4 − ξ3
(
n−1
∑
k=1
(
ξ−k3 − ξ−k4
) Ŷ(k + 1,ωi) + Ŷ(k + 1,ω−i)
2
)
+
ξ3ξ
n
4 − ξn3ξ4
ξ4 − ξ3
(
∞
∑
k=n
ξ−k4
Ŷ(k + 1,ωi) + Ŷ(k + 1,ω−i)
2
)
,
(13)
where W(1,ωi) and W(1,ω−i) solve the boundary conditions derived from Equation (12).
Note that when pi = 0 or when the distributions F1 and F2 are identical, the solution in Equa-
tion (13) collapses to becomes identical to Equation (10); in particular, we have the case studied
in earlier sections with only one state of the world. Moreover, the difference in expected payoffs
between the two states is determined solely by the difference in sample spacings between the
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FIGURE 3. W(n,ωi) with F1(v) = 1− e−v, F2(v) = 1− e−2v, r = 0.05, λ = 1, ρ = 1,
and pi = 0.05.
distributions in the two states. Note that
W(n,ωi)−W(n,ω−i) = ξn−11 (W(1,ω1)−W(1,ω−i))
+
ξn1ξ2
ξ2 − ξ1
(
n−1
∑
k=1
(
ξ−k1 − ξ−k2
) (
Ŷ(k + 1,ωi)− Ŷ(k + 1,ω−i)
))
+
ξ1ξ
n
2 − ξn1ξ2
ξ2 − ξ1
(
∞
∑
k=n
ξ−k2
(
Ŷ(k + 1,ωi)− Ŷ(k + 1,ω−i)
))
.
Whenever this difference is positive, buyers strictly prefer to be in state ωi than in state ω−i; the
converse of this is, of course, that bidding is more aggressive in state ωi than in state ω−i in the
sense of absolute magnitude of bid shading away from the true values.7 Figure 3 demonstrates
an example of this in the case that F1 dominates F2 in terms of the dispersive order as discussed
earlier. Note that W(n,ω1) > W(n,ω2) for all n. Moreover, as may be seen in Figure 4, buyer’s
payoffs in state ω1 are lower than they would be if there were no transitions to state ω2, while the
payoffs in state ω2 are higher than they would otherwise be in a one-state model. In essence, the
possibility of transitioning to an unambiguously better state improves buyer utility in state ω2,
while the possibility of transitioning to an unambiguously worse state decreases buyer utility in
state ω1.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper characterizes the manner in which current market conditions, as well as anticipated
future conditions, create an endogenous option value for bidders in a dynamic market. Since buy-
ers must trade off purchasing in the present against participating in the future, the value of this
future option is crucial for current-period bidding; however, the value of the option is itself deter-
mined by equilibrium bidding behavior. We show that this endogenous option value is, in fact,
the expected discounted sum of the potential payoffs from individual transactions in the infinite
7Note that since ∂ξ1/∂pi < 0 < ∂ξ2/∂pi, as the rate of state-to-state transitions increases without bound, there is enough
churning between the two states that the differential between the state-contingent payoffs goes to zero.
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(B) State ω2
FIGURE 4. W(n,ωi) and W(n) with distribution Fi, r = 0.05, λ = 1, ρ = 1, and pi = 0.05.
sequence of possible states of the world, each differentiated by the potential number of buyers
present on the market at that time. When the trading institution is an auction mechanism, buyers
are therefore willing to bid their true values less the discounted option value of participating in
this future sequence of auctions.
There are several directions for extending our analysis. One possibility is dropping the assump-
tion of stochastic equivalence and endowing each buyer with a fixed private value for obtaining
an object. There are several technical difficulties in conducting such an analysis in a model with
sealed-bid auctions. These complications are discussed in Said (2009). In particular, the sequen-
tial second-price auction is not efficient in the presence of buyer arrivals, so instead we examine
a model in which objects are sold using the ascending auction format. Another potentially inter-
esting line of research involves allowing for multiple simultaneous auctions, or allowing sellers
to remain on the market for several periods and overlapping with one another. Additional pos-
sibilities include endogenizing the entry behavior of buyers and sellers in response to market
conditions and dynamics, or allowing for the setting of reserve prices by sellers; in particular, con-
sidering the limit behavior of a model with a cap on the number of market participants may be
particularly useful. These extensions are, however, left for future work.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Note that, since
Pr(bti < maxj 6=i
{btj}) = 1− Pr(bti > maxj 6=i {b
t
j}),
we may rewrite V(vti , n) as
max
bti
{
Pr(bti > maxj 6=i{btj})E
[
vti − δW(n− 1)−maxj 6=i{btj}|bti > maxj 6=i{btj}
]
+δW(n− 1)
}
.
Since the trailing δW(n− 1) in the above expression is merely an additive constant, the maximiza-
tion problem above is corresponds to that of a second-price auction with n bidders in which each
bidder i’s valuation is given by vti − δW(n− 1). The standard dominance argument for second-
price auctions then implies that b∗(vti , n) = v
t
i − δW(n− 1). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Recall that Equation (3) provides an expression for V(vti , n). Taking the
expectation of this expression with respect to vti yields
E
[
V(vti , n)
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
((
x−E
[
Y(n)2 |Y(n)1 = vti
])
G(n−1)1 (x) + δW(n− 1)
)
f (x) dx
=
1
n
(∫ ∞
−∞
xg(n)1 (x) dx−
∫ ∞
−∞
E
[
Y(n)2 |Y(n)1 = vti
]
g(n)1 (x) dx
)
+ δW(n− 1)
=
1
n
(
E
[
Y(n)1
]
−E
[
Y(n)2
])
+ δW(n− 1).
Moreover, it is straightforward (see Krishna (2002, Appendix C), for instance) to show that
1
n
(
E
[
Y(n)1
]
−E
[
Y(n)2
])
= E
[
Y(n)1
]
−E
[
Y(n−1)1
]
.
This is exactly the quantity previously defined as Ŷ(n), implying that
E
[
V(vti , n)
]
= Ŷ(n) + δW(n− 1),
as desired. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Define
wm := (W(m + 1), W(m))
′ and ym :=
(
−ζ1ζ2Ŷ(m + 1), 0
)′
for all m ∈N. Then Equation (9) becomes
wn+1 = Awn + yn,
where A is the matrix in Equation (9). Applying Elayedi (2005, Theorem 3.17) yields the general
solution
wn = An−1w1 +
n−1
∑
k=1
An−k−1yk.
Recalling that ζ1 and ζ2 are the eigenvalues of the matrix A, it is straightforward to show that
Ak =
1
ζ2 − ζ1
[
ζk+12 − ζk+11 ζk+11 ζ2 − ζ1ζk+12
ζk2 − ζk1 ζk1ζ2 − ζ1ζk2
]
,
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implying that the general solution to this second-order system may be (after some rearrangement)
written as
W(n) =
ζn−12
ζ2 − ζ1
(
W(2)− ζ1W(1)− ζ1ζ2
n−1
∑
k=1
ζ−k2 Ŷ(k + 1)
)
− ζ
n−1
1
ζ2 − ζ1
(
W(2)− ζ2W(1)− ζ1ζ2
n−1
∑
k=1
ζ−k1 Ŷ(k + 1)
)
.
(A.1)
Consider the second term in the above expression. Since 0 < ζ1 < 1, the first two parts of it
are clearly bounded; in particular, we have ζn−11 (ζ2 − ζ1)−1(W(2)− ζ2W(1)) → 0 as n → ∞. The
third part of this term may be rewritten as
ζn1ζ2
ζ2 − ζ1
n−1
∑
k=1
ζ−k1 Ŷ(k + 1) =
ζ2
ζ2 − ζ1
n−1
∑
k=1
ζk1Ŷ(n− k + 1)
≤ ζ2
ζ2 − ζ1
n−1
∑
k=1
ζk1σ <
ζ2
ζ2 − ζ1
∞
∑
k=1
ζk1σ <
ζ1ζ2σ
(ζ2 − ζ1)(1− ζ1) ,
where σ2 is the (assumed finite) variance of the distribution F. This follows from Arnold and
Groeneveld (1979), who show that
E
[
Y(m)1
]
−E
[
Y(m)2
]
≤ mσ√
m− 1 for all m > 1.
Recalling the definition of Ŷ, we then have
Ŷ(m) ≤ σ√
m− 1 < σ
for all m > 1, implying that the second term in Equation (A.1) is bounded.
The first term in Equation (A.1), however, is multiplied by positive powers of ζ2 > 1, implying
that an appropriate choice of W(2) is crucial for ensuring the boundedness of our solution. One
such choice is to let
W(2) = ζ1W(1) + ζ1ζ2
∞
∑
k=1
ζ−k2 Ŷ(k + 1). (A.2)
Note that, for any W(1) ∈ R, W(2) is well-defined by the expression above, as ζ2 > 1 and {Ŷ(m)}
is a bounded sequence. The first term in Equation (A.1) then becomes
ζ1ζ
n
2
ζ2 − ζ1
∞
∑
k=n
ζ−k2 Ŷ(k + 1) =
ζ1
ζ2 − ζ1
∞
∑
k=n
ζn−k2 Ŷ(k + 1)
=
ζ1
ζ2 − ζ1
∞
∑
k=0
ζ−k2 Ŷ(n + k + 1) < ∞,
where we again rely on the boundedness of the sequence {Ŷ(m)} when F has finite variance.
Thus, for any choice of W(1), choosing W(2) in accordance with Equation (A.2) leads to a bounded
solution of the difference equation.
To show that this is the unique bounded solution, consider any fixed W(1), and denote by c¯ the
choice of W(2) corresponding to Equation (A.2). Fix any arbitrary α ∈ R, and let W(2) = αc¯.
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Then, denoting by W¯ the solution when W(2) = c¯, Equation (A.1) becomes
W(n) =
ζn−12
ζ2 − ζ1
(
αc¯− ζ1W(1)− ζ1ζ2
n−1
∑
k=1
ζ−k2 Ŷ(k + 1)
)
− ζ
n−1
1
ζ2 − ζ1
(
αc¯− ζ2W(1)− ζ1ζ2
n−1
∑
k=1
ζ−k1 Ŷ(k + 1)
)
=
ζn−12
ζ2 − ζ1
(
c¯ + (α− 1)c¯− ζ1W(1)− ζ1ζ2
n−1
∑
k=1
ζ−k2 Ŷ(k + 1)
)
− ζ
n−1
1
ζ2 − ζ1
(
c¯ + (α− 1)c¯− ζ2W(1)− ζ1ζ2
n−1
∑
k=1
ζ−k1 Ŷ(k + 1)
)
= W¯(n) +
(
ζn−12 − ζn−11
) (α− 1)
ζ2 − ζ1 c¯.
Since ζ2 > 1 > ζ1 > 0, the above expression remains bounded if, and only if, α = 1. Note that
we also have boundedness for arbitrary α if c¯ = 0. However, this would imply that W(1) =
−ζ2 ∑∞k=1 ζ−k2 Ŷ(k + 1) < 0, contradicting the boundary condition in Equation (8).
Thus, for any choice of W(1), choosing W(2) in accordance with Equation (A.2) leads to a
bounded solution. The only remaining free variable is then W(1), which is then determined
by the boundary condition derived from single-buyer behavior; that is, W(1) may be found by
combining Equation (8) and Equation (A.2), leading to the condition stated in the proposition, as
desired. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Letting a := r+pi+λ+ρρ , b := −piρ , and c := −λρ , we may then write the
coupled system defined by Equation (11) as
W1(n + 2)
W2(n + 2)
W1(n + 1)
W2(n + 1)
 =

a b c 0
b a 0 c
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0


W1(n + 1)
W2(n + 1)
W1(n)
W2(n)
+

cŶ1(n + 1)
cŶ2(n + 1)
0
0
 , (A.3)
where the subscripts on W and Ŷ denote the state of the world. Writing A for the matrix of
coefficients above, and letting
wk := (W1(k + 1), W2(k + 1), W1(k), W2(k))
′
and
yk := (cŶ1(k + 1), cŶ2(k + 1), 0, 0)′,
we can write Equation (A.3) more compactly as
wn+1 = Awn + yn.
Applying Elayedi (2005, Theorem 3.17), we then may conclude that the general solution to this
system is
wn = An−1w1 +
n−1
∑
k=1
An−k−1yk. (A.4)
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In particular, if we denote by a(k)ij the ij-th element of A
k, this may be rewritten as
(
W1(n)
W2(n)
)
=
[
a(n−1)31 a
(n−1)
32 a
(n−1)
33 a
(n−1)
34
a(n−1)41 a
(n−1)
42 a
(n−1)
43 a
(n−1)
34
]
W1(2)
W2(2)
W1(1)
W2(1)

+ c
n−1
∑
k=1
[
a(n−k−1)31 a
(n−k−1)
32
a(n−k−1)41 a
(n−k−1)
42
](
Ŷ1(k + 1)
Ŷ2(k + 1)
)
.
(A.5)
Note that A is diagonalizable: defining D := diag [ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4] and P := [v1, v2, v3, v4] to be
the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of A the matrix formed from the corresponding eigenvectors,
respectively, we may write A = PDP−1. Therefore, Ak = PDkP−1, allowing for the explicit
calculation of Ak for all k. In particular, we have
P =

−ξ1 −ξ2 ξ3 ξ4
ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4
−1 −1 1 1
1 1 1 1
 ,
which implies that
a(k)31 = a
(k)
42 =
ξk2 − ξk1
2(ξ2 − ξ1) +
ξk4 − ξk3
2(ξ4 − ξ3) , a
(k)
33 = a
(k)
44 =
ξ1ξ
k
2 − ξk1ξ2
2(ξ2 − ξ1) +
ξ3ξ
k
4 − ξk3ξ4
2(ξ4 − ξ3) ,
a(k)32 = a
(k)
41 =
ξk1 − ξk2
2(ξ2 − ξ1) +
ξk4 − ξk3
2(ξ4 − ξ3) , a
(k)
34 = a
(k)
43 =
ξk1ξ2 − ξ1ξk2
2(ξ2 − ξ1) +
ξ3ξ
k
4 − ξk3ξ4
2(ξ4 − ξ3) .
Notice that (due to the symmetry detailed above), we need concentrate only on the value function
from one state. Thus, we may (after some rearrangement) write
W1(n) =
ξn−12
ξ2 − ξ1
(
W1(2)−W2(2)
2
− ξ1 W1(1)−W2(1)2 − ξ1ξ2
n−1
∑
k=1
ξ−k2
Ŷ1(k + 1)− Ŷ2(k + 1)
2
)
− ξ
n−1
1
ξ2 − ξ1
(
W1(2)−W2(2)
2
− ξ2 W1(1)−W2(1)2 − ξ1ξ2
n−1
∑
k=1
ξ−k1
Ŷ1(k + 1)− Ŷ2(k + 1)
2
)
+
ξn−14
ξ4 − ξ3
(
W1(2) +W2(2)
2
− ξ3 W1(1) +W2(1)2 − ξ3ξ4
n−1
∑
k=1
ξ−k4
Ŷ1(k + 1) + Ŷ2(k + 1)
2
)
− ξ
n−1
3
ξ4 − ξ3
(
W1(2) +W2(2)
2
− ξ4 W1(1) +W2(1)2 − ξ3ξ4
n−1
∑
k=1
ξ−k3
Ŷ1(k + 1) + Ŷ2(k + 1)
2
)
.
Since 0 < ξ1, ξ3 < 1 and both F and G are assumed to have finite variance, it is straightforward to
verify that for any choices of W1(1), W1(2), W2(1), and W2(2) that the second and fourth terms in
this expression are bounded. As in the main text, however, the fact that ξ2, ξ4 > 1 implies that the
first and third terms may be unbounded if W1(2) and W2(2) are not chosen carefully. Therefore,
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let
W1(2) :=
ξ1 + ξ3
2
W1(1) +
ξ3 − ξ1
2
W2(1) (A.6)
+
λ
ρ
∞
∑
k=1
ξ−k2 + ξ
−k
4
2
Ŷ1(k + 1) +
λ
ρ
∞
∑
k=1
ξ−k4 − ξ−k2
2
Ŷ2(k + 1) and
W2(2) :=
ξ3 + ξ1
2
W2(1) +
ξ3 − ξ1
2
W1(1) (A.7)
+
λ
ρ
∞
∑
k=1
ξ−k4 + ξ
−k
2
2
Ŷ2(k + 1) +
λ
ρ
∞
∑
k=1
ξ−k4 − ξ−k2
2
Ŷ1(k + 1).
Verifying that these values lead to a bounded solution for W1(n) and W2(n) for any choices of
W1(1) and W2(1) follows in a manner directly analogous to that used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Finally, the values of W1(1) and W2(1) are given by the joint solution to the system of equations
derived by equating the definitions of W1(2) and W2(2) above with the boundary condition from
Equation (12):
r + λ(1− Fi(W(1,ωi)) + ρ+ pi
ρ
W(1,ωi)− pi
ρ
W(1,ω−i)
− λ(1− Fi(W(1,ωi))
ρ
E[v|v > W(1,ωi)]
=
ξ1 + ξ3
2
W(1,ωi) +
ξ3 − ξ1
2
W(1,ω−i) (A.8)
+
λ
ρ
∞
∑
k=1
ξ−k2 + ξ
−k
4
2
Ŷ(k + 1,ωi) +
λ
ρ
∞
∑
k=1
ξ−k4 − ξ−k2
2
Ŷ(k + 1,ω−i).
Uniqueness of the solution to the system of difference equations may then be shown in exactly
the same manner as in the proof of Proposition 1. Thus, after some rearrangement, the unique
bounded solution is given, as desired, by the expression found in Equation (13). 
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